Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : TCTA-RD 1978-047-118 Ado1500330002-9

## Washington

= By ROSCOE DRUMMOND =

## The Vital Role of C. I. A.

WASHINGTON.

If you drew up a list of the ten most influential officials in Washington, his name would probably not even occur to you.

If you looked at a chart of the Federal government and

sought to trace the lines of largest authority, his agency would hardly be visible.



He sits in the Cabinet not by act of Congress, as do most of the other members, but by special direction of the President.

I'm referring to Allen W. Dulles. He administers the least publicized, the least understood but the most vital arm of the United States government, the Central Intelligence Agency. Whether as its director Mr Dulles does or does not do his job well-overwhelmingly well-very likely determines, more than any very likely determines, more sign any other service to the President, whether we are winning or losing the cold war, whether we are or are not making the right judgments toward averting an atomic war.

The Dulles-operated C. I. A. is the intelligence instrument of the National Becurity Council within which the most important decisions of policy and action are made.

Roscoe Drummond

Mr. Dulles makes no policy decisions whatsoever—and nothing could more misleadingly measure the critical and powerful role he plays.

What it is Mr. Dulles' duty to do is to provide the basis-

that is, the information, the appraisal, the intelligence estimates—on which the highest policy decisions are made.

If there are serious shortfatal.

All his is why the Gen. Mark operations should be "bolder." Clark task-force study and reless diplomatically constricted port on the C. I. A. and the land that some internal reorganized intelligence agencies of zation would help to this end. They advocate a Congressional the Hoover Commission, cannot watchdog committee and suggest be appraised on the same basis that a specially selected, small as other critiques of other Federal operations.

What I am trying to say is operation periodically.

eral operations.

What I am trying to say is operation periodically, that there is no good having a second-best air force.

Should look over the operation periodically.

The C. I. A. has no obe sensitive of this

What I am trying to say is that there is no good having a second-best air force.

I am not suggesting that the C. I. A. operation is second-best. I am only suggesting that just because the C. I A. gets off relatively lightly, as such government surveys go, from the Clark investigation—indeed gets pretty high merks along with some proposals for reorganization—this is no reason why the C. I. A. or Congress or the public can sit back comfortably amid mutual congratulations.

The C. I. A. has no occasion to be sensitive of this task-force criticism. The praise is substantial and the criticism. The prais congratulations.

Gen Clark's investigation found no foundation for Sen. McCarthy's charges that the C. I. A. was infiltrated with subversives. It found no "security risks" and said the intelligence agencies were led "by a group which is sincere and dedicated copyright, 1918, N. T. Regard Tribune Inc.

decisions are made.

If the C. I. A.'s intelligence is lt gave this estimate of Allen inadequate, then American pol-Dulles: "Industrious, objective, key will almost inevitably be inative.

But the task force report and omings in the C. I. A.'s operations and if there are serious blind spots in the C. I. A.'s inmade better and needs to be telligence estimates—this isn't made better. They believe we something that is just regret—can get better and fuller information. table, this is something close to mation from behind the Iron fatal.

Curtain: they feel intelligence

near to it as to be indistinguishable.

**CPYRGHT** 

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500330002-9